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Resumen
Este artículo presenta un estudio empírico de la relación  banco-cliente, mediante una muestra de
empresas manufactureras chilenas.  Específicamente, analiza si la concentración y la duración de la
relación afecta o no el volumen de los préstamos bancarios.  Nuestros resultados indican que una
menor concentración, medida según el número de bancos donde se endeuda una misma empresa, se
asocia con un efecto grande y positivo sobre el endeudamiento.  La duración de la relación deudor-
acreedor tiene un efecto positivo —si bien no siempre estadísticamente significativo— sobre el monto
prestado.
Abstract
In this paper we empirically study bank-client relationships using a sample of Chilean manufacturing
firms. We examine whether concentration and the duration of bank-firm relationships affect the
volume of bank lending. Our results indicate that lower concentration, measured by the number of
banks a firm borrows from, is associated with a large and positive effect on borrowing. The length of
borrower-lender relationships has a positive -although not always statistically significant- effect on the
amount borrowed.
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1. Introduction
The efficiency of allocating physical capital and consumption goods over time
depends upon the functioning of the financial system. Within this market, banks
play a fundamental role as financial intermediaries, providing access to the
payment system, transforming assets, managing risk, and monitoring and
processing information (Freixas and Rochet, 1998).
In this paper we empirically study the role of banks in overcoming the frictions
that arise from asymmetric information. Specifically, we study the effects on
the volume of firm borrowing of the relationships that firms and banks develop
as a result of banks' monitoring activities. Whenever a bank lends to a firm,
the bank gathers information about the quality of the client that is not shared
by other intermediaries, i.e., banks and firms establish relationships. These
relationships reduce the extent to which moral hazard and adverse selection
problems affect the flow of credit to otherwise qualified borrowers. Developing
relationships allows the lender to better judge the quality of a borrower,
reducing the extent of credit rationing, and benefiting firms. However, the bank
may be able to use this information to extract rents, building an informational
monopoly that may reduce credit availability and distort the firms' investment
decisions.
We use a unique data set to empirically investigate these specific but crucial
aspects of financial markets. We examine bank-client relationships in a large
sample of Chilean manufacturing firms during the 1990-1998 period. In
particular, we investigate whether firm-bank relationships - measured by the
duration of lending ties - and actual bank concentration faced by firms affect
access to bank financing. On the one hand, if the interaction between a bank and
its clients mitigate informational asymmetries over time, then, conditional on
the creditworthiness of a firm, the availability of credit should increase with
the length of such relationships. On the other hand, if a single lender can
exploit an informational monopoly, firms that rely on multiple lending ties
should have better access to bank loans. However, there are transaction costs in
dealing with more than one bank, because monitoring efforts are duplicated and
banks may free ride on each other reducing the level of screening effort.
Furthermore, debt renegotiation becomes increasingly complicated when the number
of creditors involved grows (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Finally, credit
market competition reduces the ability of the firm and the creditor to
intertemporally share a surplus, and the extent to which the bank can finance
profitable projects when the firm's cash flows are low (Petersen and Rajan,
1995). Thus, multiple banking relationships are not necessarily beneficial for
borrowers.
Since the consequences of concentration and relationship length on access to
bank lending are theoretically unclear, the empirical assessment of these
effects is especially valuable. Moreover, given the particular characteristics
of an emerging economy like Chile, this assessment should ideally be done using
country-specific data.
Most of the empirical literature on financial market imperfections has focused
on the consequences on investment of internal funds availability (in the line of
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) to conclude that borrower-lender
information asymmetries are a key determinant of external funding access.
Indeed, a number of articles have studied the effects of lender-borrower
relationships on firm performance, e.g. on the value of the firm and investment
decisions. Relationships and the extent of the asymmetric information problem
have been measured in many ways. For instance, in studying the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow according to the degree of attachment to banks, Hoshi,2
Kashyap and Stein (1991) associate belonging to a large industrial group as a
proxy for weaker asymmetric information. With this same purpose in mind,
Schaller (1993) uses the degree of ownership concentration as a measure of
information problems, Whited (1992) uses a dummy to capture whether a firm has a
bond rating, and Fohlin (1998) uses the number of the firm's board members that
sit at a bank's board of directors. Both Medina and Valdés (1998) and Gallego
and Loayza (2000) examine this same issue for Chile, using alternative measures
of information asymmetries. This paper takes one step back, and studies the
empirical plausibility and importance of the asymmetric information problem on
bank lending. It also investigates the implications of competition and
concentration for bank lending at the microeconomic level.
The issues we examine in this paper are important in their own right for the
functioning of the financial market, particularly regarding credit access of
small - and medium-sized firms, and in turn, have distinct implications for both
market performance and policy. They are also relevant for understanding monetary
policy. For instance, monopoly power arising from either information asymmetries
or straight lack of competition may also modify an otherwise standard
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Bank lending could also amplify or
dampen the effects of monetary policy through endogenous changes in the external
finance premium (the credit channel of monetary policy).1
Our results indicate that lower concentration, measured by the number of banks a
firm is related to, has a positive and economically relevant impact on the the
volume of bank lending. Controlling for firms' age, the length of borrower-
lender relationships has a positive effect on loans, although its significance
is not robust to alternative estimation methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 quickly revisits some
theory and previous empirical work. Section 3 describes the construction and
main characteristics of the data set. Section 4 presents the main findings,
evaluating the effects of bank concentration and lender-borrower relationship
length on borrowing volume. Finally, section 5 presents the main conclusions and
discusses a few policy implications.
2. Theory and Previous Empirical Evidence
From a theoretical point of view, both bank concentration and the length of
lender-borrower relationships have ambiguous consequences on access to bank
loans. As for concentration, Diamond (1984) develops a model in which bank
financing is less expensive than borrowing from public lenders, since
intermediaries can save on monitoring and agency costs. Ramakrishnan and Thakor
(1984) and Allen (1990) give banks a special screening role. In either model,
under increasing economies of scale, concentration may further reduce costs or
enhance efficiency. Marquez (2002) shows that increased competition among banks
may lead to information dispersion, increasing the costs of borrowing. A market
with few large banks, he concludes, can have lower interest rates than a market
with many small banks. In the same venue, if too many banks serve one particular
client, incentives to properly monitor may weaken due to the commons problem,
and in turn, increase costs.
At the same time, however, while bank control can reduce costs and increase
efficiency, market power by banks may of course result in monopoly pricing if
competition and/or contestability are weak. Furthermore, a single bank may build
up an ex post information monopoly that adversely affects lending (Sharpe, 1990
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and Rajan, 1992). This hold-up problem can make it costly for a firm to switch
lenders, as it may signal that the bank with the information monopoly is
unwilling to lend to the firm. In this case, the bank can extract rents from the
firm and possibly distort its investment decisions. Concentration, therefore,
may produce a borrower capture. This problem is likely to be more relevant if
banks observe other banks' lending, because the stigma arising from denying or
cutting financing is stronger.
One can also postulate that competition may affect the value of relationship
lending, modifying the amount banks are willing to invest in a relationship.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that greater inter-bank competition reduces bank
lending rents and decreases the importance of relationship lending. Boot and
Thakor (2000) extend Petersen and Rajan's model to allow for competition from
the rest of the capital market (e.g., mutual funds and investment banks). They
find that increased inter-bank competition may increase relationship lending,
but then each loan has lower value added for borrowers. Furthermore, they find
that higher competition from the capital market reduces total bank lending as
well as relationship lending, although each relationship loan has higher value
added for borrowers.
As for lender-borrower relationships, it is straightforward to argue that a
lengthier relationship produces a more durable connection that alleviates
information asymmetries, thereby reducing financial costs.2 Long relationships,
however, can potentially be costly for a borrower, if the stigma from cutting
financing is higher the longer -and thus the more informed- is the relationship.
There are a number of empirical studies on the effects of concentration and
relationships. Regarding concentration, and using detailed information on the
debt structure of American publicly traded corporations, Houston and James
(1996) find that firms that borrow from a single bank, as opposed to firms that
borrow from multiple banks, depend less on bank loans to finance their
operations when growth opportunities are important. This evidence is consistent
with the notion that information monopolies allow banks to extract rents from
borrowers. They also find that banks specialize in lending to smaller and less
risky firms (relative to the typical firm in their sample).
Cetorelli (2001) reviews both the theory and the evidence of the effects of
competition on the banking industry, and concludes that the common wisdom that
restraining competition always reduces welfare is not necessarily correct. For
instance, using a panel of 36 industrial sectors for a group of 41 countries,
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration does impose a
deadweight loss on the credit market as a whole, resulting in a reduction of
credit supply. However, the effect is heterogeneous across industrial sectors:
industries that depended heavily on banks for investment and growth benefit from
concentration, presumably because they develop closer relationships. Using the
ratio of banks' small business loans to total assets, Berger, Goldberg and White
(2001) study the effects of banking entry and of bank M&A's on the supply of
small business credit by other banks. They find that there are modest aggregate
external effects of both M&A's and new entries, and that these effects depend on
bank size. Using a panel of country experiences, Levine (2000) finds that bank
concentration is not strongly associated with negative outcomes in terms of
financial development, industrial competition, or banking fragility.
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On the subject of bank-client relationships and concentration, Petersen and
Rajan (1994) study the effects of lender-small-business relationships on
interest rates and loan availability (the latter proxied by the percentage of
firm's trade credits paid late). They find a positive association between the
number of banks that lend to a firm and the interest rate charged for the latest
loan, but no significant connection between this rate and the length of the
firm-lender relationship. They also find a negative effect of the length of the
longest relationship and the firm's age on loan availability, although this
latter variable is positively related to the number of banks from which the firm
borrows. Berger and Udell (1995) analyze the role of lender-borrower
relationships on the loan rate spreads (over the lending bank's premium rate)
paid by small firms. They find a negative correlation between the length of the
firm's relationship and these spreads. Blackwell and Winters (1997) find a
positive correlation between the bank's monitoring effort and the loan's
interest rate, and that banks monitor firms with which they have closer ties
less often. Cole (1998) studies the effect of pre-existing relationships between
firms and lenders on loan availability and find a positive association. He does
not find any role for relationship length.
Chakravarty and Scott (1999) empirically study the effects of relationships in
the market for consumer loans using a data set that allows them to identify
credit constrained individuals. They find that the following characteristics
significantly lower the likelihood of being liquidity constrained: (i) the
length of the relationship between a household and a potential lender; (ii) the
number of activities a customer has with his/her bank (proxied by the number of
accounts); and (iii) the number of financial institutions that a household has
relationships with. Furthermore, they find that the rates charged on
collateralized loans are less sensitive to these relationship variables than the
rates on uncollateralized loans.
All these papers use data from the US economy from which lessons are not
directly applicable to an emerging market economy like Chile. In a closely
related paper and using Chilean manufacturing data, Repetto, Rodríguez and
Valdés (2002) find that lower concentration, measured by the number of banks a
firm borrows from, is associated with lower costs of loans. They also find that
the length of lender-borrower relationships has a negative effect on interest
rates paid. These findings are at odds with the results of Petersen and Rajan
(1994), using US firm data. In comparison to the US, Chilean firms and the
financial market structure are both considerably different. Among other things,
bankruptcy procedures are not alike, firm size differs substantially, the number
of banks is much smaller in Chile, and the Chilean market is highly
collateralized.
3.  Data
The data in this study come from two sources. The first data set covers
information on all credit transactions between commercial banks and firms. The
information is collected by the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones
Financieras (SBIF), the commercial bank regulatory and supervision government
agency.3 The data set contains information on the amount borrowed by each firm
from each commercial bank, the fraction of outstanding and past-due loans,
(cartera vencida}, including also data on credits paid late, mora), and the
credit risk rating of the loan assigned by each lending bank. In Chile, all
individuals and firms are assigned a unique identification or taxpayer code when
they are born or legally incorporated, known as Rol Unico Tributario or RUT.
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This code is recorded in the data set, and allows us to follow-up firms over
time.4
This data set has been matched with the second source we use, the Encuesta
Nacional Industrial Anual or ENIA, a survey on manufacturing firms conducted
annually by the statistics government agency (Instituto Nacional de
Estadísticas, INE). The ENIA covers all manufacturing plants that employ at
least ten individuals. Thus, it includes all newly created and continuing plants
with ten or more employees, and it excludes plants that ceased activities or
reduced their hiring below the survey's threshold. The ENIA covers about 50% of
total manufacturing employment.5 It collects detailed information on plant
characteristics, such as manufacturing subsector (at the 4 digit ISIC level),
ownership status, sales, employment, location, and investment. Although not
reported in the publicly available data set, the survey records the firms' RUT,
so the two data sets can be matched.6
Matching firms across surveys induces a series of measurement problems. The most
important, the SBIF data gathers information on all the firm's activities,
whereas the ENIA only records manufacturing related activities. Thus, if a firm
produces manufacturing and non-manufacturing goods and services under the same
RUT, the SBIF data will represent a broader set of activities than will the
ENIA. This means that we may overestimate the debt. Furthermore, the ENIA
records information at the plant level, and not at the firm level. Still, we
were able to add up information on plants belonging to the same firm as long as
they produce under the same RUT.
After excluding firms with no debt, our data set contains almost 13,000
observations on 2,063 firms over the 1990-1998 period. Nominal figures were
deflated using the value added and gross production deflators constructed by
ECLAC at the three digit ISIC level (see Yagui, 1993). These adjustments take
into account that stock variables are recorded at year end prices, whereas the
prices of flow variables represent within year averages.
Table 1 reports basic statistics on sales, employment, physical capital stock,
and profits, by industrial sector.7 The average firm hires 149 employees, sells
just over 4.6 billion pesos, holds a capital stock of almost 2.9 billion pesos,
and earns profits of 1.4 billion pesos (or roughly 11.2, 7.0, and 3.4 million
dollars, respectively, translated at the average 1996 exchange rate.) The
largest firms belong to the 372 (non ferrous metals), 314 (tobacco), 353
(petroleum refining), 371 (steel products), and 341 (pulp and paper) sectors.
The smallest firms belong to the 385 (scientific and professional equipment),
390 (other manufacturing products), 354 (oil and coal products), 323 (leather
products), and 331 (wood products, except furniture) sectors.
Table 2 describes the borrowing patterns of the sample firms. The first three
columns report total debt (in thousands of 1996 Chilean pesos) for all firms,
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firms were randomly assigned a new identification code that allows us to follow them over time.
5 Industrial employment accounts roughly 16% of total Chilean employment.
6 The surveys were matched by Central Bank and SBIF statisticians who assigned the new identification code to firms.
7 Capital is reported (at book value) only since 1996. We constructed the series using the information on investment
and the capital accumulation equation  11 (1) ttt KKI d -- =-+ . We used the depreciation rates in Liu (1991) and the
investment deflators in Bergoeing et al. (2002). This procedure forces us to drop a large number of observations in
regression models that include the capital stock, because capital cannot be estimated for firms that were in the sample
only in years prior to 1996. Capital stock includes machinery, vehicles, buildings, furniture and other forms of capital,
but excludes land.6
and according to firm size. Firm size categories are based on employment
quintiles, so the second entry represents the level of debt of the smallest 20%
of firms. The average firm owes over 1.1 billion pesos (over 80 million pesos at
the median). The average ratio of debt to capital stock is 2.14, and the median
is 0.48. Although the amount borrowed increases with firm size, the ratio of
debt to capital stock does not: the smallest and the largest firms have the
highest average ratios. One possible explanation to this pattern is that smaller
firms have a higher demand for funds, and that those small firms that do obtain
loans get large amounts relative to their capital stocks. At the other end of
the distribution, larger firms are offered more loans, and borrow more from
banks despite their better ability to raise funds from different sources. An
alternative explanation is that our matching procedure induces mismeasurement of
the debt-capital ratios, and that these errors are larger for smaller firms. The
median ratio of debt to capital is hump-shaped. This median should be more
robust to our measurement problems.
The table also reports our measures of firm closeness to its creditors. Columns
seven and eight report the number of banks that lend to each firm in the
sample.8 On average, sample firms have a lending relationship with about 2.9
banks. At the median, firms borrow from 2 banks. The number of related banks
strongly increases with firm size. The smallest 20% of firms have, on average,
slightly less than two lenders (one lender at the median), whereas the largest
20% of firms borrow on average from over 5.1 banks (4 at the median).
A second measure of closeness to a bank is credit concentration. The firm-
specific Herfindahl index we report was calculated using the shares of total
debt borrowed from each of the banks that actually lend to the firm. This
measure also shows that bank lending is highly concentrated, and that
concentration decreases as firm size increases.
Our final measure of firm-bank closeness is the duration of the relationship.
Table 3 presents four alternative measures of our loan tenure variable. Each of
them intends to capture different assumptions about the information on borrowers
that banks share. The first two columns of the table show the number of years
the firm has been borrowing from the banking system starting in 1989. On
average, firms have been servicing loans for at least 5.3 years (or 5 years at
the median). The second measure takes as a proxy of the strength of the
relationship the age of the newest loan currently being served, whereas the
other two proxies take the age of the oldest outstanding loan, and the weighted
average of the loans' ages, using debt size as weights.9 Clearly, all these
variables are a censored measure of the actual age of the loans anytime a firm
was already borrowing in 1989. However, if the firm was either created or got
its first loan later on in our sample period, then the relationship's length is
properly measured. Except for the newest loan, there is an increasing
relationship between the measures of firm-bank ties and the size of the firm at
the mean. This is consistent with the notion that smaller firms tend to be
younger, and with the fact that censoring of the duration variable might have a
larger effect on big firms.
Our empirical application below examines the effects of all these variables.
However, it is worth noting that banks do not share all the information on
borrowers. Specifically, commercial banks in Chile have access to information on
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newest loan and the age of the relationship with the system), and the highest is 0.9 (between the age of the oldest loan
and of the relationship with the system).7
the total amount borrowed by each firm (with respect to the complete banking
system), and whether firms have loans overdue. They know the total amount that
is overdue, and the lending institutions involved, although not the exact
distribution among creditors. The SBIF provides this information to each bank on
a monthly basis.
The distribution of debt-capital ratios is highly skewed. Figure 1 and Table 4
present these distributions.10 Not only are the means and medians quite
different, but also the distribution contains extremely high and low values.
Possibly, a number of these extreme observations are due to our matching
procedure. Since the median, unlike the mean, is less affected by these extreme
observations, the regression analysis below is based on Least Absolute
Deviations (LAD) methods and not on OLS.11
4.  Relationships, Concentration and Firm Borrowing Patterns
As mentioned in section 2, the closeness of firm-bank relationships has
theoretically an ambiguous effect on the availability of funds. First, lengthy
relationships allow banks to learn more about the firm, its projects and
managers, alleviating information asymmetries. However, if (positive)
information on a firm cannot be easily conveyed to the rest of the banking
system, then lengthy relationships may lead to information monopolies: if a firm
requests a loan from a non-connected bank, it may signal that the related bank
is not willing to lend. This hold up problem is more relevant for firms with
closer ties. Key for interpreting our findings below is the fact that banks do
not share all the information they gather on borrowers as they lend.
Concentration measures have also an ambiguous effect on lending volume. On the
one hand, bank concentration may be cost efficient. On the other, concentration
can lead to monopoly pricing and to information monopolies. In this and the next
section, we empirically estimate the effects of the length of firm-bank
relationships on the availability of funds.
4.1  Benchmark Estimates
Our benchmark econometric model includes three sets of variables. The first one
includes variables that capture the effects of firm-bank relationships on
lending: the age of the oldest loan, the firm specific Herfindahl index, and the
number of lending banks. The second set intends to control for firm
characteristics, such as size -measured by the natural log of sales and the
number of employees-, profitability -measured by the ratio of current profits
over sales-, and quality -measured by firm age and an indicator of credit
history. Finally, we add time dummies to control for aggregate shocks that
affect all firms, sectoral dummies at the 3-digit ISIC level, and regional
dummies to account for differences across locations. 12
The length of the relationship and the age of the firm are correlated. Older
firms have been producing for a longer time period. If firm's age is a proxy for
firm's quality, then older firms are more likely to be able to borrow.
Furthermore, a selection bias due to exit can lead to a positive effect of age
on the amount borrowed. In order to distinguish the age effect from the
relationship duration effect we add controls for the age of the firm. We do not
observe directly the date in which the firm was created. However, RUTs are
assigned by the Internal Revenue Service chronologically; i.e., a younger firm
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has a larger RUT number than an older firm. These identification numbers are
assigned within ownership categories. For instance, individuals are given RUT
numbers ranging between 1 and 48 million, limited liability corporations have
RUT numbers between 77 and 80 million, and publicly listed companies have RUTs
between 90 and 97 million. Since we are not allowed to directly observe the
RUTs, Central Bank statisticians created a variable we label rank RUT. This
variable is an ordering from larger to smaller RUT (so the lowest number is
assigned to the youngest firm) within ownership categories. There are 11
categories in our data set; however, over 90% of the sample is made up of
individuals, limited-liability corporations and publicly traded companies.
The first four columns of table 5 present our benchmark specification using
alternative measures of relationship length. The first column uses the number of
years the firm has been borrowing from the banking sector, and the next 3
columns use the age of the newest outstanding loan, the age of the oldest
outstanding loan, and the weighted average of the age of current loans,
respectively. In all specifications our relationship measures have a positive
and significant effect on debt to capital ratios, i.e., firms that have been
borrowing for a long period are capable of funding a larger fraction of their
capital stock through the banking system. The size of the effect is quite
similar across specifications, varying betweeen 0.0103 and 0.0138. These
magnitudes are large, as they represent about 2.1% to 2.9% of the median debt-
capital ratio in the sample. Because the regressions already control for the age
of the firm, this effect should effectively capture the role of ties between
firms and banks. However, the effect might be overestimated, as our duration
measures are right-censored.
Concentration, as measured by the firm specific Herfindahl index, has a large
and negative effect on the amount borrowed. Also, the number of banks from which
firms borrow has a positive and large effect on loans. The lower panel of the
table shows the estimated effect of increasing the number of banks from which a
firm borrows from one to two (assuming equal bank shares), and from two to
three. Moving from one to two relationships allows firms to increase their debt
to capital ratios by about 35 percentage points, and from two to three banks by
about 20 percentage points. Figure 2 plots the estimated effect of increasing
the number of relationships as well as +/- 2 standard errors, assuming that debt
is split equally among banks.13 The magnitude is always large and significant.
Moreover, as the number of ties increases, the effect of the Herfindahl index
tends to disappear, and the total effect converges to the coefficient of the
number of related banks.14
To allow for a more flexible specification of the effect of concentration on
firm borrowing, columns (5) to (8) replace the Herfindahl and the number of
banks by a set of dummies that account for the number of banks the firms relates
to. All the coefficients turn out to be negative and significant. The estimated
effect is decreasing - in absolute terms - in the number of banks; i.e., firms
with fewer relationships borrow less. The bottom panel of the table reestimates
the effect of an extra relationship using these specifications. The effect of
moving from a single relationship to two is quite similar to the effect of
moving from two to three. The effect (about 25 percentage points) is, on
average, very close to the effect estimated in the previous set of regressions,
so the combined effect of our concentration variables turns out to be robust to
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n
, where nis the number of relationships. Thus the
limit of this index as n ﬁ¥is 0.9
alternative functional specifications. It is worth noting that the use of the
number of relationship dummies does not alter the other regression results
materially.
As to the control variables, both firm size variables show that larger firms
have lower debt to capital ratios. At first, this result appears to be
counterintuitive. However, larger firms have better access to other forms of
financing. Probably, as they grow larger, firms become increasingly dependent on
arm's length financing, and not on the banking system.15 The estimation results
indicate that if a firm hires 100 more employees (about a third of the standard
deviation of employment in the sample), then the debt-capital ratio falls by 4
percentage points. Moreover, a 1% increase in the value of sales reduces the
ratio by 0.3 percentage points.
The effect of profits is also counterintuitive: as firms become more profitable,
they finance a larger fraction of their capital stock through bank loans.
However, it is worth emphasizing that these regressions are reduced form
regressions, so profitable firms have perhaps better access to funds, even
though they are in less need of them. If a bank can spot this profitability, it
will probably be more interested in lending. According to our regression
results, if sales as a fraction of profits increase by one percentage point, the
debt capital ratio increase by 0.05 percentage points.
A lengthier relationship alleviates the information asymmetries between banks
and firms. However, firms are only able to get more loans as long as the
revealed information is good. The next regression includes a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm had overdue loan in the past (during our sample
period).16 We find that negative information on past loans has a negative impact
on the availability of current funds. If a firm was delinquent in the past, it
can today finance about 3.4 percentage points less of its capital stock with
banking debt.
Finally, our age controls show that older firms finance a smaller share of their
capital stock with debt. The effect is significant for individuals and limited
liability corporations, but not for publicly traded companies. Within our sample
period, 23 new individually owned plants, 44 new limited liability companies,
and 46 new publicly traded companies appear in our data set.17 Therefore, and
according to the regression estimates, the newest individually owned firm has a
debt-capital ratio that is 0.14 percentage points larger than the last firm of
this ownership type created in 1990, whereas the newest limited liability firm's
ratio is 0.18 percentage points higher. Although the effect on publicly owned
companies is not significant in most specifications, the point estimate
indicates that the newest firm of this type in the sample has a ratio of almost
0.05 percentage points larger.
In sum, in this section we have found that our measures of the closeness of
firm-bank relationships have a large impact on the availability of funds.
Relationships do matter, and have a beneficial effect on firms. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that not all information is public and easily
                                                                
15 In fact, this is precisely what Houston and James (1996) find.
16 According to Chilean bank regulation, a loan is classified as past due when an installment of either principal or
interest is overdue 90 days or more. Banks can start legal collection procedures when installment of principal or interest
is overdue. Nevertheless, banks can begin the collection process before 90 days if there is a presumption of a
significant deterioration in debtor's quality.
17 These new firms do not necessarily represent start ups. Some of these firms may have hired more than 10 employees,
and/or may have borrowed from the banking system for the first time. Most firms in our sample already existed in
1989-1990.10
verifiable and that close ties between firms and lenders do alleviate
informational asymmetries. Furthermore, our results indicate that borrowing
concentration does make firms worse off. Economically, the greatest effect
occurs when the number of ties is relatively small. In the next subsection we
extend the analysis to alternative assumptions on the statistical behavior of
the concentration variables.
4.2 Endogeneity of Concentration Measures
An alternative interpretation of the role of concentration is that the amount
borrowed and the number of lending banks are mechanically related: more debt
should naturally be supplied by more banks. This is consistent with the large t-
statistics of the estimated coefficients (see Table 5). However, this need not
be the case. In order to borrow more, firms may choose not to relate to more
banks, as there are fixed costs in establishing ties. And even if this is the
case, the linear term should capture this effect, and the large effect measured
by the Herfindahl index would still be relevant. Alternatively, one could argue
that there are legal limits on how much a bank can lend to a single firm. These
limits, however, are most likely non-binding for most of our firms. Finally, it
is worth mentioning that if loans are collateralized, firms need to have
divisible guarantees in order to borrow from different banks.
To control for these potential problems, we reestimated our regression model
through a two step procedure. In the first stage we obtain the ordinary least
squares prediction from the regression of the problematic variables (the number
of related banks and the Herfindahl index) on the other exogenous variables and
a number of instruments. In the second stage we estimate the parameters of the
model by a least absolute deviation regression of debt-capital ratios on the
projected and exogenous variables.18
We use two types of instruments: the number of banks in the locality (provincia)
and a set of dummies indicating bank mergers.19 These dummies are equal to one
if the firm was borrowing from two banks that merged in that given year, and
zero otherwise.20 We believe that these variables are correlated with the number
of banks a firm can establish a relationship with, and with inter-bank
competition (and thus with the lending concentration faced by borrowers).
Furthermore, we treat these variables as truly exogenous to individual firms.
Table 6 presents the estimated results. The first column uses the five merger
dummies only, whereas the second column uses the complete list of instruments.21
Both specifications show that the age of the relationship has a positive effect
on firm borrowing. However, neither shows a significant effect. Although the
sign of the Herfindahl index is reversed, this time we cannot reject the null
that the effct of this concentration variable is zero. In spite of this, the
effect of the number of related banks is positive and significant, indicating
that the establishment of a new relationship increases the availability of funds
to firms. Specifically, we find that an extra realtionship increases the debt-
capital ratio of the firm by about 20 percentage points. This effect is much
larger than the one presented in table 5. The lower panel of the table repeats
                                                                
18 This procedure is a modified version of 2SLS, with a LAD regression (instead of OLS) in the second stage.
19 There are 51 provincias in Chile.
20 The following are the relevant mergers within our sample period: (1) O'Higgins and Centro Hispano in 1993, (2)
O'Higgins and Bank of Hong Kong in 1993, (3) BHIF and Banesto in 1995, (4) Osorno and Santander in 1996, and (5)
O'Higgins and Santiago in 1997.
21 The table reports the results using the age of the newest outstanding loan. The LAD procedures using the alternative
relationship length variables did not converge. We believe that these alternative specifications should lead to similar
results, given the high correlation among these definitions, and the results in table 5.11
our earlier exercise where we estimate the effect of increasing the number of
banks from which a firm borrows from one to two, and then from two to three. The
effect of a second bank is statistically not different from zero, perhaps
because the Herfindahl index is not significant. However, as the number of banks
increases, the effect approaches the coefficient of the number of relationship
variables, and becomes large and significant.
The estimated effect of the other control variables is not materially affected,
with a slightly larger effect of the payment history of the firm, and of the
size measures.
Summing up, we have again found that bank lending concentration is harmful for
firms in terms of funds availabilty. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that concentration leads to monopoly pricing and information
monopolies. However, we do not find that lengthy relationships allow firms to
borrow more.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
We have examined the effects of concentration and the length of bank-lender
relationships on the volume of bank lending using a sample of Chilean
manufacturing firms. After controlling for size, economic sector, (relative)
firm age, location, profitability and credit history, we find that concentration
appears to be very important for the volume of bank lending. The results show
that the debt to capital ratio rises significantly as concentration falls, and
that this effect is considerably larger when the number of bank-firm
relationships is small. For instance, controlling for the linear effect of the
number of banks a firm is related to, increasing the number of relationships
from one to two rises the median debt to capital ratio from 0.48 to about 0.82,
whereas increasing the number of relationships from two to three rises the
median debt to capital ratio from 0.48 to about 0.68. The length of borrower-
lender relationships (measured by the age of the oldest relationship with the
banking system) has a positive, though not always significant, effect on the
volume of loans. One extra year of relationship increases the debt to capital
ratio by 2.1% to 2.9%.
These results motivate a few policy implications. First, they show that, on
average, a lengthier relationship is convenient for firms. Thus, policy makers
should not worry if firms persistently choose to do business with the same
banks. And second and most important, the evidence is consistent with the idea
that enhancing the number of relationships that a particular firm has can
increase the volume of credit.
There are important practical consequences from the latter implication. To begin
with, tax policy should avoid lock-in effects that make it difficult for firms
to “shop around”. More significantly, policy should foster multiple
relationships. And chief among the difficulties a typical firm faces for having
multiple relationships is the indivisibility of collateral or guarantees. It has
long been recognized in Chile that moving guarantees across banks is a difficult
task. In fact, some people have proposed to centralize the administration of
guarantees in order to facilitate bank shifts. The evidence of this paper shows
that this might not be enough. True competition needs firms to relate
contemporaneously to more than one bank, and for that purpose firms need
divisible collateral. The proposed central agency could provide that service.12
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(Base 1989=100)”,Estadística y Economía, 6, 129-163.Firms Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev.
All firms 2063 12913 149 56 322 4623 449 30700 2890 195 19000 1403 73 11900
Manufacturing subsector
(3 digit ISIC)
311 567 3052 146 39 293 3848 373 21600 2274 99 11000 1153 66 8991
312 40 217 238 106 377 15800 796 64500 4695 911 10700 5684 59 26900
313 58 361 228 151 322 6792 559 19300 5553 1528 13300 2608 42 10000
314 3 9 628 681 274 85900 895 133000 37500 30000 26800 61600 -3176 110000
321 202 1231 134 57 263 2693 584 8395 969 191 2698 867 132 4024
322 146 831 135 56 352 3424 487 15500 546 78 3267 1216 116 8662
323 34 190 100 54 136 3941 605 13500 732 241 1872 1037 158 4612
324 64 377 186 56 317 1543 343 3943 723 122 1834 274 60 2101
331 120 668 100 40 174 3125 422 11400 1196 126 4920 1247 81 6726
332 49 285 134 43 241 2205 390 6910 740 130 2322 478 73 3019
341 37 210 272 100 442 7871 1105 22400 29400 838 102000 2715 147 12000
342 101 590 126 37 272 3308 328 15700 1911 162 7992 905 58 7690
351 40 182 113 56 136 5018 562 12300 4976 463 12400 1414 108 4911
352 112 714 183 125 221 7589 652 41200 2430 1015 5665 2142 1 13700
353 3 12 546 648 231 164000 16000 233000 205000 177000 162000 39100 -132 73200
354 11 72 92 57 113 4250 246 11500 2258 317 4499 1384 -26 5533
355 26 164 113 40 191 2824 441 9477 1503 246 5121 678 74 4736
356 109 598 127 73 143 4204 532 32500 1675 366 4461 1331 85 12500
361 4 28 150 198 94 639 201 970 1444 385 2296 -53 -1 565
362 17 110 186 93 224 5428 646 10800 6681 381 19000 2042 156 5196
369 60 365 123 55 152 4491 354 13100 4458 133 15200 1585 88 6928
371 21 100 382 136 817 6791 214 29800 6197 858 14800 821 -196 11700
372 17 97 871 281 1805 25000 643 94000 32800 5828 54600 -617 -294 26600
381 224 1270 111 59 125 2227 476 5813 1317 207 3736 624 64 2714
382 91 478 128 51 458 8982 461 97000 3089 165 27500 2884 66 35000
383 30 190 149 102 142 6068 719 21900 1984 554 4665 2230 143 10300
384 45 249 143 55 169 5338 398 25700 1367 191 2667 1108 38 6269
385 13 76 66 49 50 1857 403 4158 447 115 735 515 85 2135
390 36 187 67 45 73 4309 479 23200 270 111 573 2226 123 14700
   Source: ENIA and SBIF data set.
Table 1. Sample Characteristics
Number of Employment  Sales (million 1996 pesos) Capital (million 1996 pesos) Profits (million 1996 pesos)Mean Median St.Dev Mean Median St.Dev Mean Median Mean Median
All firms 1163171 80657 4337847 2.1 0.5 21.8 2.9 2.0 0.71 0.74
By number of employees
10-24 98544 11550 1322544 2.8 0.4 19.3 1.7 1.0 0.85 1.00
25-41 157334 33490 1434784 1.9 0.5 6.3 2.0 2.0 0.79 0.97
42-77 374676 84281 2110044 1.4 0.6 3.7 2.4 2.0 0.72 0.74
78-181 714376 258753 1809108 2.7 0.5 42.4 3.1 2.0 0.65 0.61
182-8580 4489760 1455891 8288604 1.8 0.5 12.2 5.1 4.0 0.52 0.45
Sources: SBIF data set and ENIA.
Debt (thousands of 1996 pesos) Debt/Capital Number of Banks Herfindahl
Table 2.  Bank BorrowingMean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All firms 5.3 5.0 3.3 2.0 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.0
By number of employees
10-24 5.1 5.0 3.6 3.0 4.7 4.0 4.2 4.0
25-41 5.1 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.7 4.0 4.2 4.0
42-77 5.3 5.0 3.3 3.0 4.9 5.0 4.3 4.0
78-181 5.6 5.0 3.2 2.0 5.3 5.0 4.6 4.0
182-8580 5.6 5.0 2.8 2.0 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.2
Sources: SBIF data set and ENIA.
Table 3.  Relationship Length










   Mean 2.137
   St. Deviation 21.836
   Minimum 0.00000
   Maximum 1954.50
   N Observations 12913
   Sources: SBIF data set and ENIA.
Table 4. Distribution of Debt-Capital Ratios(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relationship Length
     With the Banking System 0.0138 0.0107
[2.785]** [2.549]*
    Current Min 0.0103 0.0108
[3.588]** [3.776]**
    Current Max 0.0103 0.0089
[2.784]** [2.604]**
    Weighted Average 0.0137 0.0132
[4.154]** [4.359]**
Herfindahl -0.4300 -0.4646 -0.4238 -0.4479
[14.251]** [14.602]** [13.641]** [14.694]**
Number of Banks 0.1262 0.1268 0.1260 0.1263
[32.935]** [31.352]** [32.073]** [32.543]**
Number of Relationships Dummies
     Single Relationship -0.9027 -0.9292 -0.8995 -0.9089
[70.890]** [55.019]** [61.658]** [64.737]**
    Two Banks -0.6488 -0.6582 -0.6471 -0.6519
[49.081]** [39.427]** [43.303]** [44.071]**
    Three Banks -0.4095 -0.4053 -0.4082 -0.4102
[27.034]** [21.675]** [23.883]** [24.177]**
Loan Overdue 90 days + -0.0352 -0.0349 -0.0304 -0.0340 -0.0329 -0.0303 -0.0232 -0.0280
[1.729] [1.638] [1.454] [1.644] [1.937] [1.455] [1.211] [1.473]
Rank Rut - Individuals -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00003
[2.362]* [2.207]* [2.219]* [2.047]* [1.584] [1.226] [1.459] [1.381]
Rank Rut - Limited Liability -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004
[8.594]** [7.957]** [8.217]** [8.280]** [10.395]** [8.242]** [9.225]** [9.163]**
Rank Rut - Publicly Traded 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00003
[0.181] [0.383] [0.016] [0.052] [1.809] [1.529] [1.693] [1.470]
Ln (Sales) -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0091 -0.0079 -0.0095 -0.0092
[0.869] [0.610] [0.881] [0.911] [3.105]** [2.194]* [2.868]** [2.809]**
Employment -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
[18.190]** [17.327]** [17.534]** [18.252]** [12.872]** [10.668]** [11.502]** [11.616]**
Profit/Sales 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
[1.457] [0.977] [1.455] [1.356] [1.614] [1.401] [1.446] [1.522]
Constant 0.2388 0.4917 0.3146 0.4767 0.9299 1.1568 1.0121 1.5351
[1.757] [3.746]** [2.113]* [3.751]** [8.378]** [9.218]** [7.580]** [13.335]**
Number of obs. 12913 12913 12913 12913 12913 12913 12913 12913
Pseudo R
2
0.0511 0.0512 0.0511 0.0513 0.0476 0.0478 0.0476 0.0478
Effect of One Extra Relationship
     From 1 to 2 banks 0.341 0.359 0.338 0.350 0.254 0.271 0.252 0.257
     (St. Error) 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.013
     From 2 to 3 banks 0.198 0.204 0.197 0.201 0.239 0.253 0.239 0.242
     (St. Error) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.017
Table 5. The Determinants of Firm Borrowing. Benchmark Estimates.
(Dependent Variable: Debt to Capital Ratio)(1) (2)




Number of Banks 0.1895 0.2105
[3.206]** [3.672]**
Loan Overdue 90 days + -0.0593 -0.0716
[1.495] [1.861]
Rank Rut - Individuals -0.00013 -0.00013
[4.235]** [4.255]**
Rank Rut - Limited Liability -0.00006 -0.00006
[8.483]** [8.808]**
Rank Rut - Publicly Traded 0.00001 -0.00001
[0.121] [0.296]








Number of obs. 12913 12913
Pseudo R
2 0.0111 0.0185
Effect of One Extra Relationship
     From 1 to 2 banks 0.156 0.013
     (St. Error) 0.304 0.295
     From 2 to 3 banks 0.178 0.145
     (St. Error) 0.066 0.064
Table 6. The Determinants of Firm Borrowing. Instrumented Estimates.
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